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“New” Markets for Ecosystem Services? A Comparison of Experiments 
Addressing Establishing A Market for Farmland Ecosystem Services 
 
Many ecosystem services enjoyed by local communities from farmland are public 
goods and are consequently under-provided. For instance, agricultural land may provide 
wildlife habitat, scenic views, and groundwater aquifer recharge. Because it is often 
prohibitively difficult to preclude non-payers from benefiting from the good, markets for 
ecosystem services often suffer from free-riding. For this reason, providing farmland 
ecosystem services is quite challenging. The typical remedy for under-provision of public 
goods involves government intervention, often in the form of levied taxes and subsidies. 
However, these measures may not result in the socially optimal level of provision 
because they act on a regional scale and may inadequately account for local 
characteristics. Market approaches aim to provide incentives for agricultural land owners 
to incorporate ecosystem services into their business plans as additional output for which 
monetary compensation may be received. Theoretically, constructing a market for 
ecosystem services would facilitate payment transfers from those who value the service 
most to those who can produce it by the least-cost method. However, constructing new 
markets for public goods is complicated by non-exclusivity and the resultant problem of 
free-ridership. This study describes the results of two experiments, a hypothetical choice 
experiment and a revealed preference experiment aimed at designing a market in which 
farmers and local beneficiaries of the ecosystem service contract for the provision of 
nesting bird habitat in Jamestown, Rhode Island.  Specific attention is placed on the 
payment elicitation mechanism. The ultimate goal of this research is to address the 
manner in which choice experiments can be used to predict market behavior in order to 
facilitate contract design and market construction.   
Designing an efficient market for ecosystem services requires truthful expression 
of beneficiaries’ preferences. Several mechanisms for eliciting accurate expressions of 
willingness to pay have been proposed in the literature. The aim of different elicitation 
mechanisms is to minimize the incentives for individuals to free-ride on others’ 
contributions. The unique aspect of the two experiments is that both field experiments 
utilized several types of elicitation mechanisms with provision points: a pivotal 
mechanism based on the Clarke tax, provision point with money back guarantee, and   3 
uniform price auctions. Since elicitation mechanisms were common to both studies, they 
provide a unique opportunity to compare the relative performance of each mechanism in 
achieving truthful revelation of willingness to pay. 
The ecosystem service being offered in both experiments was habitat for 
grassland nesting birds called Bobolinks (Dolichonyx oryivorus).  Hay harvesting on 
farms in Jamestown, Rhode Island destroys nests containing fledgling Bobolinks every 
spring, contributing to substantial mortality in the population (Sauer et al. 2004).  The 
proposed market would establish a price that community members would pay farmers to 
delay hay harvest on different plots of land in order to mitigate the damage to the 
Bobolink fledgling cohort caused by this agricultural practice. 
The first experiment was a hypothetical choice experiment wherein residents of 
the town of Jamestown were presented with several potential contracts designed to delay 
hay harvesting on plots of farmland in order to preserve nesting bird habitat. Subjects 
were assigned to different elicitation mechanisms and administered several questions in 
which they were asked to compare two farm-wildlife contracts with varying levels of 
attributes and determine whether they would pay the posted price for one, both or neither 
of the contracts. A conditional logit model was applied to the responses and it was 
determined that the type of elicitation mechanism imposed had an impact on valuation of 
the contracts (Uchida et al. 2007). 
A well-documented drawback of stated preference methods is the presence of 
hypothetical bias. There is a substantial body of literature illustrating that hypothetical 
bias of stated choice experiments leads to over-estimation of WTP (Ethier et al. 2000).  
By comparing the two experiments, we find evidence supporting this finding. 
The second experiment was a revealed-choice experiment whereby acceptable 
contracts were drawn up between the mediators and farmers in the same community of 
Jamestown, RI. Community members were solicited for payment toward provision of the 
contracts, again via the different types of elicitation mechanisms.  In addition to the 
application of competing mechanisms, individuals were randomly assigned either open-
ended or binary choice questions.  This experimental market was open to the residents of 
Jamestown in early 2007 and again in early 2008. The markets successfully provided five 
of ten potential field contracts.  Similarly, it was determined that elicitation mechanism   4 
had an impact on valuation estimates. By comparing the incentive-compatible 
mechanisms between the two experiments, we may, in theory, eliminate the effect of 
free-ridership and determine the effects of hypothetical bias on the prediction of 
willingness to pay in the market. 
Another interesting facet of the combined studies is the ability to examine the 
robust anomaly of higher revelations due to the binary choice question format when 
compared to open-ended formats.  Several studies cite the intriguing result that, on 
average, binary choice questions reveal higher willingness to pay values than open-ended 
questions.  The revealed preference study described herein adds to the body of evidence 
in support of this tendency.  
Two main research questions have emerged from the combined experiments.  The 
first stems from the fact that, while the performance of different elicitation mechanisms at 
addressing free-ridership has been well tested in the lab, the issue of whether the 
mechanisms perform as expected in actual market settings has not been properly 
addressed.  The unique advantage of the two experiments is that they apply nearly the 
same mechanisms to the valuation of a service in a “new” and unfamiliar market setting.  
The uniform price auction mechanism adversely impacts the valuation estimates in the 
market experiment but has highest valuation in the hypothetical choice experiment.  This 
implies that, if stated preference methods are to be used to predict market behavior, 
design is an important consideration.  For instance, according to the evidence presented 
here, one would expect predictions to suffer if the revealed preference experiment utilizes 
an elicitation mechanism that is different than the mechanism applied in the stated 
preference experiment, and not in the expected manner.  While the pivotal mechanism, 
based on the Clarke Tax, would theoretically yield highest valuations, we find in both 
surveys that it does not outperform the provision point with proportional rebate 
mechanism.  We explore this result further.   
The second research question addresses the long-standing observation that binary 
choice questions often elicit higher payments than open-ended questions (Balistreri et al 
2001).  We compare estimates of willingness-to-pay from the SP choice experiment with 
both binary choice and open-ended questions in the RP experiment to determine whether 
there are consistent differences in WTP revelation. While there is no reason to believe   5 
that hypothetical bias differs between mechanisms, what does vary is incentive to free-
ride.  We compare the incentive-compatible mechanisms between the two studies in order 
to reveal the nature of hypothetical bias.  Then we can use this information to address the 
issue of the discrete choice method. 
Guided by the initial results from the two studies, individual-specific willingness-
to-pay estimates were derived from the SP data via a random-parameter logit model. 
Several authors have cited the advantages, when deriving willingness-to-pay estimates 
from RP logit models, of specifying the model in WTP-space rather than the 
conventionally used utility-space specification.  Many have found that this specification 
avoids setbacks in WTP estimation by the conventional specification and results in more 
reasonable estimates (Scarpa et al. 2007, Das et al. 2009, Train and Weeks 2005).  These 
values were compared, by elicitation mechanism, with the values offered in the revealed 
preference experiment. In addition, the stated preference data was used to augment 
estimation of the RP equation in order to determine the extent to which willingness to pay 
estimates from SP experiments can be used to predict market behavior. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the ecosystem service under 
analysis.  Sections 3 and 4 review the stated preference and revealed preference 
experiments.  Section 4 describes the method used to construct the willingness-to-pay 
estimates.  Section 5 presents the data. Section 6 describes the method used to combine 
the data.  Section 7 presents results and section 8 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
Farmland Ecosystem Services for Jamestown, Rhode Island: The Bobolink 
  In order to facilitate the design of a local market for ecosystem services, it was 
important to choose an ecosystem service that could be easily quantified, implemented on 
a sufficiently short time line, and be relatively inexpensive.  Consequently, habitat 
preservation in the form of protection for fledgling bird populations was chosen.  To this 
end, the black and yellow Bobolink (Dolichonyx oryivorus) species was chosen.  
Bobolinks utilize hay fields in Jamestown as nesting habitat during the months of May 
and June.  Hay harvesting and grazing activities during this period prove devastating to 
cohort success.  Optimal harvest of hay in Jamestown occurs during mid-June.  In order 
to protect the Bobolink cohort, “farm-wildlife” contracts were designed in an attempt to   6 
garner enough funds to cover the farmers’ costs of delaying harvest until after July 4
th.  
This would effectively incentivize farmers to incorporate farmland ecosystem services 
into their business plans.   
  Jamestown, Rhode Island is a small community of 4500 residents inhabiting 2800 
households.  There are 9 farms on the island, most of which produce grass-fed beef.  
There has in the past been evidence that the Jamestown community places a high 
valuation on its farms.  In addition, its residents tend to have a keen sense of attachment 
to the community.  
 
The Stated Preference Survey 
  The SP survey was designed as a multi-question choice experiment mailed to the 
residents of Jamestown from October to December of 2006.  There were 5 questions 
comparing two potential contracts and a sixth question with one potential contract.  The 
sixth response was not utilized in this analysis, but may be useful in determining 
predictive validity in the future.   Each contract was described by the list of attributes 
outlined in Table 1.  Respondents were asked whether they would choose contract A, 
contract B, both, or neither.  A full description of the survey design and implementation 
can be found in Euchida et al. 2007.     
  We shall describe the three mechanisms that were common to both experiments.  
The pivotal mechanism is designed such that the respondent pays only if her bid is 
pivotal; that is, her contribution makes the difference between the good being provided 
and not. This mechanism was included because it has been demonstrated to be incentive-
compatible in mitigating freeriding.  The second mechanism, the proportional rebate 
mechanism, collects bids from all respondents and if more money than is needed is 
collected, returns the balance as a proportion of bid amount. The third mechanism, 
uniform price auction, is designed so that a uniform price is ultimately administered to all 
bidders whose willingness to pay exceeds a reserve price.  That all participants ultimately 
pay the same price has two effects.  First, it mirrors the “law of one price” aspect of 
conventional markets and, second, there is a notion of equity not present in the other 
mechanisms.  That is, all participants ultimately have the same financial responsibility 
toward provision of the good.   7 
  Euchida et al. 2007 utilized a conditional logit model to explore the effects of the 
various elicitation mechanisms on the marginal utilities of the attributes of the contracts 
and the marginal utility of income.  They found that elicitation mechanisms had the most 
significant effect on the marginal utility of income. The mechanisms were not found to 
jointly affect the marginal utility of the contract attributes.  Base utility level was also not 
found to be affected by mechanisms.  In addition, the authors computed marginal 
willingness-to-pay estimates and mean WTP for a contract with typical attributes and 
compared them by mechanism.  They concluded that, for a typical farm-wildlife contract, 
the pivotal mechanism had the lowest estimated WTP. 
 
The Revealed Preference Survey 
  The market experiment was conducted over a two year time period and issued to 
the same population on Jamestown, RI.  (We shall focus on the results from the survey 
sent out during the first year, 2007, with ambitions to combine the stated and revealed 
preference data to test predictive validity on the 2008 data.)  The researchers approached 
the farmers of Jamestown and successfully established contingent contracts on six of the 
hay fields in 2007.  After substantial marketing efforts, the solicitation was mailed to all 
residents in March of that year.  The households were randomly assigned to particular 
groups that were administered different elicitation mechanisms, parcel contracts, and 
solicitation formats (binary choice or open-ended).  Sufficient funds were raised to 
compensate for the provision of the contracts on three of the six contingent contracts. 
The researchers were primarily interested in determining the effects of the 
different elicitation methods on participation and payment in the market.  They used a 
random effects probit model to analyze the participation decision and a panel-selection 
adjusted interval regression model to capture the determinants of the payments offered.  
Readers are referred to the authors for further details of the experiment.   
The findings of primary importance to the research goals outlined in this paper are 
as follows.  With regard to the solicitation format, discrete choice questions were found 
to result in nearly $25 higher offers regardless of mechanism.  This supports common 
findings in contingent valuation studies (Boyle et al. 1996, Balistreri et al. 2003, 
Halvorsen and Saelensminde 1998, Cameron et al. 2002).  In addition, they found that the   8 
pivotal mechanism does not elicit significantly different payments than the proportional 
rebate mechanism but that the uniform price auction elicited $19 less per respondent.  
Participants were not found to participate based on mechanism. 
 
The mixed logit model and utility in WTP space 
The first step in addressing our research goals was to derive individual-specific 
estimates of willingness-to-pay from the hypothetical choice experiment.  It is our 
intention to use these estimates to compare responses from the binary choice format with 
the open-ended format.  In addition, we aim to use the estimates to test the efficacy of the 
different mechanisms at predicting payment in the constructed market.  We utilized a 
random parameter, or mixed, logit model to derive these estimates.  RP logit models are 
often used to incorporate individual-specific heterogeneity over choice attributes.  
Carlsson et al. (2003) used random parameter logit to identify attributes that affect 
valuation of wetlands.  Brownstone, Bunch, and Train (2000) estimate joint RP and SP 
models of alternative vehicle choice.  Bhat and Sardesai (2006) modeled transportation 
mode choice using joint RP and SP methods.  Greene et al. (2006) incorporate 
heterogeneity in the means of the random parameters in a model of commuter mode 
choice.   
  The model is formulated as follows.  Suppose an individual i = 1…I faces a 
choice instance defined by c alternatives.  Further assume the individual is presented with 
T such choice occasions.  Utility is assumed separable in price so that the utility to 
individual i of choice c in choice occasion t follows random utility theory: 
      (1) 
where the parameters alpha and omega may vary randomly in the population. For our 
purposes, this model specifies that the price coefficients are fixed but that most attribute 
coefficients vary randomly in the population such that   where   is the 
vector of population means of the coefficients, σ is the standard deviation of the marginal 
distribution of φ, and ρi is a random term assumed to be distributed normal. εict captures 
unobserved attributes that may affect utility and is assumed to be Gumbel-distributed 
with variance that is individual-specific and defined as Var(εict) = λi
2(π
2/6), where λi is the 
scale parameter for each individual. The scale parameter is the standard deviation of the   9 
unobserved utility. Dividing the utility equation by the scale parameter yields scale-free 
error variance: 
   (2) 
where now eict is type I extreme value with constant variance.   
  If the coefficient on the price attribute is specified to be random, then calculating 
willingness-to-pay requires dividing two distributions by each other.  If the distribution of 
the price coefficient has mass close to or at zero, then this will lead to implausibly large 
estimates of willingness-to-pay. A normal distribution allows implausible positive cost 
coefficients and log-normals allow the cost coefficient to be arbitrarily close to zero 
which provides implausibly high estimates of WTP.  Most studies avert this difficulty by 
specifying constant cost parameters.  However, lately there has been interest in re-
formulating the model in “willingness-to-pay” space rather than preference space.  We 
outline the basic theory below.  
A simple rearrangement of equation (2) redefines the specification in willingness-
to-pay space.  This allows the researcher to specify the distribution of WTP directly.    If 
we define 
€ 
δi = (αi /λi) and 
€ 
κi = (ϕi /λi), then equation (2) simplifies to 
€ 
Uict = −δipict +κi'xict + eict    (3) 
The implied willingness-to-pay for an attribute is 
€ 
ωi =κi /δi =ϕi /αi.  Using this 
information, we can once again formulate the utility function as: 
 
€ 
Uict = −δipict + (δiωi)'xict + eict   (4) 
This specification was originally proposed by Cameron (1988).  Recently, Train and 
Weeks (2005) estimated a hierarchical Bayes specification of the model and Das, 
Anderson, and Swallow (2009) implemented a classical maximum-likelihood version.  
Most have found that while this alternative specification may or may not fit the data 
better, the resultant welfare measures are more tenable.  Since the measurement of WTP 
from the mixed logit model is central to our analysis, we spent some time comparing the 
two approaches and shall present the results of this comparison.   
 
Data 
We focus on the 790 people who returned the SP surveys in 2007.  Of those, 759 
individuals received solicitations in the market experiment. 137 individuals returned the   10 
revealed preference survey with a response that they would make an offer.  78 responded 
that they would not make an offer, and 548 did not return the survey.   
With regard to comparing mechanisms, there were 187 individuals who returned 
the SP survey and were issued the UPA treatment in both experiments.  48 returned 
surveys 25 made offers.  There were 208 individuals in 2007 who were issued the PM in 
both years.  50 Returned a RP survey. Of those 50, 38 made offers.  206 individuals 
received the proportional rebate mechanism in both experiments.  61 returned the RP 
survey, 40 made offer, and 21 did not (Table 1). 
 
Methods 
  From the individual-specific estimated willingness-to-pay values, we construct an 
indicator function as follows: 
In =   1 if estimated willingness to pay is greater than discrete choice 
value or lower bound of open-ended scale 
  0 otherwise 
We use the indicator function as an instrumental variable in the estimation of the panel-
selection adjusted interval regression payment equation.  We compare the results by 
mechanism paying specific attention to whether respondents had matching mechanisms 
in both studies or not and how this impacts the estimation.  In addition, we examine the 
relationship between the discrete choice and open-ended responses. 
More to follow… 
 
Results 
Specifying the random parameters in the RP logit model is one of the most 
complicated steps.  A description of the variables used in the estimation can be found in 
table 2.  The attributes of the contracts in the RP study are included for comparison (table 
2a).  Descriptive statistics for the SP variables are presented in table 3.  The model 
presented here is specified in preference space.  Results from the model specified in WTP 
space are forthcoming.  The ultimate model specification presented here is the result of a 
specification search described by Revelt and Train (2000).  The coefficient on highbobo 
was fixed because its standard deviation was insignificant in most specifications.  All cost 
coefficients were similarly specified as fixed variables in order to facilitate calculation of   11 
willingness to pay estimates.  Specifying fixed cost coefficients allows WTP for each 
attribute to have the same distribution as the coefficient of the attribute.  This follows 
many prior studies’ specification (Carlsson et al 2003, Sillano and Ortuzar 2005).  This 
implies that the marginal utility of income is constant for all individuals (contingent upon 
treatment mechanism), an unfortunate feature of specifying the model this way.  There 
are expected to be significant gains from re-specifying the model in WTP space so as to 
avoid this unfortunate restriction. 
  We included results from a conditional logit model for comparison (See table 4).  
The RP logit model performs significantly better than the conditional logit model.  All 
population mean coefficients are significant as well as the standard deviations of the 
random parameters.  The significant standard deviations implies the existence of 
heterogeneity in preferences among respondents.  All coefficients have the expected sign.  
Marginal utilities are positive for all attributes of the contract except for cost.  The 
alternative-specific constant that corresponds to accepting both contracts switches signs 
between the conditional logit model and the RP logit model, but the standard deviation of 
the variable is highly significant.  All cost coefficients have the expected sign. 
  From these estimates, we calculate the estimated marginal willingness-to-pay 
based on the population mean (Table 5).  We find these results to be consistent with 
previous research. 
In a pooled model of all respondents regardless of elicitation method 
administered, the willingness-to-pay estimates from the RP logit model predicted 
behavior better in the discrete choice version of the revealed preference study than the 
open-ended version.   
Overall, the WTP instrument predicted offers correctly 52% of the time, with 41% 
over-prediction rate.  Of this sample of individuals who were administered the uniform 
price auction in both studies, the SP instrument predicted correctly 55% of the time, with 
45% over-prediction rate. In the sample of individuals who were sent pivotal mechanism 





Determining the relative performance of various elicitation mechanisms at 
predicting market behavior is of crucial importance with regard to designing new markets 
for ecosystem services. With market-based mechanisms for providing ecosystem services 
gaining in popularity, having true estimates of willingness to pay will help inform policy 
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Proportions of individuals who were administered identical mechanisms in both surveys 
Mechanism  Returned 
Survey 




61/206  40  21 
Uniform Price 
Auction 
48/187  25  23 
Pivotal 
Mechanism 
50/208  38  12 




Attributes and Attribute Levels for Choice Experiment 
Attribute  Description  Levels 
Cost  Cost of Contract  $10, $20, $35, $45, $60, 
$75, $85, $105 
Acres  Number of acres to be 
placed under contract upon 
which farmer will delay 
mowing and harvesting  
10, 25, 40, 55 
High Bobolink  Level of expected 
fledglings saved (correlated 
with acreage) 
Low, high 
Tour  Residents who pay into a 
particular contract may be 
invited to a bird walk led by 
expert birders. 
Invited, Not Invited 
View  Whether the proposed 
acreage is viewable from 
the road 
View, No view 
Restore  Number of acres to be 
restored to active hay fields, 
not restricted to delayed 
mowing/harvesting. 




Attributes and Attribute Levels for Revealed Preference Experiment  
Attribute  Description  Levels 
Size  Size of the field under 
contract 
6.2, 10, 10.6, 11.4, 18 
Number of territories  Number of Bobolink 
territories support by the 
field in 2006 
1 through 4 
View  Whether there is a view of 
the field from the road 
None, Partial, Yes 
Elicitation Mechanism  Pivotal Mechanism, 
Proportional Rebate, 




Descriptive statistics for attributes included in final model 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Cost    53.28  47.18  0  190 
Acres    3.23  2.75  0  9.5 
High Bobolink    0.38  0.49  0  1 
Tour    0.35  1.28  -1  2 
PM mechanism    0.20  0.40  0  1 
VCM 
mechanism 
  0.10  0.30  0  1 
PPPR 
mechanism 
  0.21  0.41  0  1 
UPA 
mechanism 




Mixed logit Results 
  Conditional 
Logit 
Random Parameter Logit 
VARIABLES    Mean  SD 
       
cost  -0.0175***  -0.0278***   
  (0.00106)  (0.00171)   
costvcm  -0.00703***  -0.0118***   
  (0.00159)  (0.00279)   
costpppr  -0.00496***  -0.0112***   
  (0.00125)  (0.00235)   
costupa  -0.00699***  -0.0123***   
  (0.00127)  (0.00236)   
costpm  -0.00687***  -0.0118***   
  (0.00128)  (0.00231)   
highbobo  0.102***  0.148**   
  (0.0395)  (0.0582)   
asc_no  -0.569***  -0.775***  0.580*** 
  (0.0929)  (0.151)  (0.144) 
asc_both  0.189**  -0.299*  1.410*** 
  (0.0933)  (0.154)  (0.103) 
acres  0.0159***  0.0280***  0.0366*** 
  (0.00148)  (0.00271)  (0.00343) 
restore  0.0229***  0.0386***  0.0391*** 
  (0.00221)  (0.00361)  (0.00686) 
view  0.116***  0.184***  -0.366*** 
  (0.0231)  (0.0358)  (0.0846) 
tour  0.105***  0.249***  0.671*** 
  (0.0248)  (0.0439)  (0.0603) 
LL  -4502.2753  -3595.6011   
Observations  14972  14972  14972 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   19 
 
Table 5. 
Marginal willingness to pay for attributes, 90% confidence interval 
Attribute  Conditional Logit  Random Parameter Logit 
using Krinsky Robb method 
















Tour  6.00 
(3.0845-8.8511) 
8.97 
(5.713-12.1578) 
 
 